A New Correlation Coefficient for Aggregating Non-strict and Incomplete
  Rankings by Yoo, Yeawon et al.
A New Correlation Coefficient for Comparing and
Aggregating Non-strict and Incomplete Rankings
Yeawon Yoo a, Adolfo R. Escobedo, and J. Kyle Skolfield
P.O. Box 878809, Tempe, AZ 85287-8809
School of Computing, Informatics, and Decision Systems Engineering
Arizona State University
{yyoo12, adres, joshua.skolfield}@asu.edu
aCorresponding author
E-Mail: yyoo12@asu.edu
Phone: +1-(480)-965-5248
ar
X
iv
:1
80
1.
07
79
3v
4 
 [s
tat
.A
P]
  1
6 F
eb
 20
19
A New Correlation Coefficient for Comparing and
Aggregating Non-strict and Incomplete Rankings
Abstract
We introduce a correlation coefficient that is designed to deal with a va-
riety of ranking formats including those containing non-strict (i.e., with-
ties) and incomplete (i.e., unknown) preferences. The correlation coeffi-
cient is designed to enforce a neutral treatment of incompleteness whereby
no assumptions are made about individual preferences involving unranked
objects. The new measure, which can be regarded as a generalization of
the seminal Kendall tau correlation coefficient, is proven to satisfy a set of
metric-like axioms and to be equivalent to a recently developed ranking dis-
tance function associated with Kemeny aggregation. In an effort to further
unify and enhance both robust ranking methodologies, this work proves the
equivalence of an additional distance and correlation-coefficient pairing in
the space of non-strict incomplete rankings. These connections induce new
exact optimization methodologies: a specialized branch and bound algo-
rithm and an exact integer programming formulation. Moreover, the bridg-
ing of these complementary theories reinforces the singular suitability of the
featured correlation coefficient to solve the general consensus ranking prob-
lem. The latter premise is bolstered by an accompanying set of experiments
on random instances, which are generated via a herein developed sampling
technique connected with the classic Mallows distribution of ranking data.
Associated experiments with the branch and bound algorithm demonstrate
that, as data becomes noisier, the featured correlation coefficient yields rel-
atively fewer alternative optimal solutions and that the aggregate rankings
tend to be closer to an underlying ground truth shared by a majority.
Keywords: Group decisions and negotiations; robust ranking aggregation;
correlation and distance functions; non-strict incomplete rankings
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1. Introduction
The consensus ranking problem (i.e., ranking aggregation) is at the cen-
ter of many group decision-making processes. It entails finding an ordinal
vector or ranking of a set of competing objects that minimizes disagreement
with a profile of preferences (represented as ranking vectors). Common ex-
amples include corporate project selection, research funding processes, and
academic program rankings [34]. Moreover, the mathematical measures and
aggregation algorithms devised to solve the consensus ranking problem often
find ready application in many other fields. In Information Retrieval, these
fundamental tools have been used to compare, aggregate, and evaluate the
accuracy of metasearch engine lists [32]. In recommendation systems, they
have been used to evaluate the similarity between the characteristics of users
or items. Based on the measured similarity, for example, the recommenda-
tion system suggests items that the most similar users have liked, or the
most similar item that a user has liked [30, 46]. Hence, although this work
considers the group decision-making context of ranking aggregation for ease
of interpretability, many of its results could be readily adapted to various
other contexts such as Artificial Intelligence [5] and Biostatistics [9, 10, 11].
Although the mathematical roots of consensus ranking trace back to the
development of voting systems of de Borda [20] and Condorcet [12], signifi-
cant work remains to deal with real-world situations that upend many of the
problem’s rigid and long-running assumptions. These issues have garnered
renewed interest from the Operations Research community owing largely to
the general intractability engendered by the more robust ranking aggrega-
tion systems [65]. Even so, it may be beneficial to consider transdisciplinary
efforts in solving close variants of this problem. This work incorporates
concepts from the statistical literature where the analogous median rank-
ing problem has been used for classification, prediction, and several other
applications [19, 33, 57]. The fundamental goal of the present work for
intertwining these viewpoints is to reinforce and advance theoretical and
computational aspects of consensus ranking when dealing with indispens-
able forms of ranking data. Additionally, this unison is intended to yield
insights and perspectives that are generalizable to various other contexts.
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This work deals with the consensus ranking problem in which the set
of input rankings may contain ties and may be incomplete, which is the
rule rather than the exception in group decision-making [23, 43]. Hence,
utilizing frameworks that possess this flexibility of preference expression is
imperative; otherwise, judges are implicitly forced to make arbitrary and/or
careless choices. In essence, since there is typically a finite budget or set of
benefits that is to be allocated commensurate with the competitors’ posi-
tions in the consensus ranking, the chosen frameworks must employ robust
measures that align with the given context. To be precise, this work adopts
a neutral treatment of incomplete rankings, whereby a judge’s preferences
over his/her unranked objects are unknown—because in the most general
case it is assumed he/she does not evaluate them. Therefore, no inferences
are made about individual preferences of unranked objects relative to other
unranked or ranked objects. Such a treatment is particularly prudent for
situations where the subjective evaluation of a large object set can be re-
alistically accomplished only via the allocation of smaller subsets—which
may differ both in content and size—to various judges. Furthermore, this
work emphasizes desired social choice properties in group decision-making
including the ability of the aggregate outcome to assign equitable electoral
power to each ranking input and to reflect the preferences of a majority [8].
This work makes the following novel contributions. First, it demon-
strates that the τx ranking correlation coefficient devised in [23] is inade-
quate for enforcing a neutral treatment of incomplete rankings. Second, it
derives the τˆx ranking correlation coefficient and formally establishes its ax-
iomatic foundation for dealing with a wide variety of ranking inputs. Third,
it proves that the featured correlation coefficient—itself a generalization of
the τ [39] and τx [23] correlation coefficients—is equivalent to an axiomatic
ranking distance recently developed in [58], and it establishes a connection
between another distance-correlation pairing. Altogether, the first three
contributions refine and unify distance and correlation-based ranking ag-
gregation. Fourth, it leverages these connections to induce new exact op-
timization methodologies for solving the non-strict incomplete ranking ag-
gregation problem. Fifth, it extends the repeated insertion model [21] to
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sample non-strict incomplete rankings from statistical distributions linked
with the classic Mallows-φ distribution [53]; these instances are leveraged to
evaluate the abilities of τx and τˆx to satisfy two key social choice properties.
The paper is organized as follows. §2 introduces the adopted notational
conventions. §3 reviews the pertinent literature on axiomatic distances and
correlation coefficients for measuring differences and similarities between
rankings. §4 derives theoretical results that strengthen the correlation-based
framework for handling non-strict incomplete rankings and, in particular,
its advantages to engender new exact optimization methodologies for the
related ranking aggregation problem. §5 develops an efficient statistical
sampling framework from which nontrivial ranking aggregation instances
are constructed; these are then used to compare key social choice-related
properties associated with τx and τˆx. Lastly, §6 concludes the work and
discusses future avenues of research.
2. Notation and preliminary conventions
Denoting V = {v1, . . . , vn} as a set of objects, a judge’s ranking or
ordinal evaluation of V is characterized by a vector a of dimension of n,
whose i-th element denotes the ordinal position assigned to object vi. If
ai < aj , a is said to prefer vi to vj (or to disprefer vj to vi), and when
ai = aj , a is said to tie vi and vj , where 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n and i 6= j. Additionally,
when ai is assigned the null value “•”, vi is said to be unranked within a;
the objects explicitly ranked in a are denoted by the subset Va ⊆ V (i.e.,
ai 6= • for vi ∈ Va). For example, in the 5-object ranking a = (1, 2, 2, •, 4), v1
is preferred over v2, v3, and v5; v2 and v3 are tied for the second position
but both are preferred over v5; v4 is left unranked; and Va = V \{v4}.
It is important to emphasize that, according to the neutral treatment of
incomplete rankings adopted in this work, although any object vi ∈ V that
is unranked within a receives the same assignment ai = •, it is not considered
tied with other unranked objects or better/worse than the ranked objects
Various ranking aggregation systems may not be defined or equipped to
properly handle the full variety of ranking data formats alluded to in the
preceding paragraphs. For this reason, the following definitions highlight
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three primary ranking spaces by which they can be categorized.
Definition 1. Let Ω = {•, 1, . . . , n}n denote the broadest ranking space
consisting of all (i) strict, (ii) non-strict, (iii) complete, and (iv) incomplete
rankings—corresponding to rankings (i) without ties, (ii) with and without
ties, (iii) full, and (iv) partial and full, respectively. Since non-strict and in-
complete rankings also encompass strict and complete rankings, respectively,
Ω is denoted henceforth as the space of non-strict incomplete rankings.
Definition 2. Let ΩC = {1, . . . , n}n denote the space of complete rankings
over n objects, which consists of all non-strict (and strict) rankings where
every object is explicitly ranked (i.e., partial evaluations are disallowed).
Definition 3. Let ΩS = {•, 1, . . . , n}n denote the space of strict rankings
over n objects, which consists of all incomplete (and complete) rankings
where no objects are tied.
From the above definitions, it is evident that ΩC ⊂ Ω, ΩS ⊂ Ω, and
ΩC and ΩS are incomparable. To describe the ranking aggregation problem
addressed in this work, let τ˙(·) : Ω2 → [−1, 1]1 denote an arbitrary ranking
correlation function—here, the overhead dot is used to disassociate this gen-
eral function from the standard Kendall-tau coefficient [39], with which the
undotted symbol is typically associated. The correlation-based non-strict
incomplete ranking aggregation problem (NIRA) is stated formally as:
arg max
r∈ΩC
K∑
k=1
τ˙(r,ak), (1)
where ak ∈ Ω for k = 1, . . . ,K (i.e., k is the index of each judge or ranking).
Alternatively, letting d˙(·) : Ω2 → R1+∪{0} denote an arbitrary ranking dis-
tance function—the overhead dot disassociates this symbol from any specific
distance function—the distance-based NIRA is stated formally as:
arg min
r∈ΩC
K∑
k=1
d˙(r,ak). (2)
Expression (1) can be intuitively interpreted as the problem of finding a
ranking r that maximizes agreement—quantified according to τ˙—collectively
5
with K non-strict incomplete rankings; Expression (2) can be intuitively in-
terpreted as the problem of finding a ranking r that minimizes disagreement—
quantified according to d˙—collectively with the same inputs. For certain
distance and correlation-coefficient pairings (see §4.3), the two respective
optimization problems are equivalent. It is imperative to point out that,
although the input rankings are allowed to be incomplete to allow flexibility
of preference expression, the consensus ranking is required to lie in the space
of complete rankings—that is, r ∈ ΩC is a constraint of both problems.
3. Literature review
The principal focus of this work is on deterministic metric-based meth-
ods for comparing and aggregating rankings, which are regarded as the most
robust methodologies within Operation Research and Social Choice [8]. The
reader is directed to [14] for a review of score or utility based methods, which
are more computationally efficient but cannot fulfill certain fundamental
properties associated with voting fairness (e.g., the Condorcet criterion [12]
and its extensions [69, 70]). Additionally, there is a rich body of literature
on nondeterministic or model-based ranking aggregation methods (e.g., see
[24, 53, 56]). While these often rely on axiomatic distances, they are incom-
parable with the featured context in various notable respects including their
assumptions, aggregation processes, and outputs.
3.1. Axiomatic distances
Ranking aggregation has been primarily associated with axiomatic dis-
tances, several of which have been proposed to address different variants
of the original problem [14]. In these works, a distance function is typi-
cally advocated as the most suitable for aggregating inputs drawn from a
specific ranking space through a set of mathematical axioms it uniquely sat-
isfies. Additional criteria for judging the suitability of different distances is
through the verification of the social choice properties they satisfy; the latter
can be described through said axioms (characterized by comparisons of two
rankings) and through characteristics exhibited by the consensus rankings
(characterized by comparisons with all of the input rankings).
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Among various notable axiomatic distances that have been introduced,
only those proposed in [15, 22, 58] were purposely designed to deal with
the broadest ranking space Ω under a neutral treatment of incomplete rank-
ings. Hence, this subsection restricts most of its attention to these distances
and on the precursor distance upon which they are founded. This first ax-
iomatic distance was introduced by Kemeny and Snell in [38] for rankings
in ΩC ; the distance function, written here succinctly as dKS , quantifies the
disagreement between a pair of complete rankings as follows:
dKS(a, b) =
1
γ
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
|sign(ai − aj)− sign(bi − bj)| , (3)
where a, b ∈ ΩC and γ is a constant associated with a chosen minimum
positive distance unit. In [38], γ = 2, corresponding to a minimum distance
unit of 1 (since each object pair is counted twice in the above expression), but
henceforth γ is fixed to 4 corresponding to a minimum positive distance unit
of 1/2, which does not affect the solution to Problem (2) but has a convenient
interpretation for handling ties [58]. Put simply, dKS(a, b) measures the
number of pairwise rank reversals required to turn a into b. The distance is
synonymous with robust ranking aggregation in space ΩC [1] owing to the
combination of social choice properties it uniquely satisfies (see [69, 70]).
Distance dKS was extended to handle incomplete rankings in [15, 22].
The underlying axioms for this distance, referred to as the Projected Kemeny
Snell distance and written here succinctly as dP−KS , are provided in [58].
The corresponding distance function between a, b ∈ Ω is defined as:
dP−KS(a, b) = dKS(a|(Va⋂Vb), b|(Va⋂Vb)), (4)
where a|(Va⋂Vb), b|(Va⋂Vb) denote the projections of each ranking onto the
subset of objects evaluated in both rankings. In other words, dP−KS enforces
the intuitive interpretation that ranking disagreements should be based only
on the objects ranked in common by a and b. That said, evidence from [58]
suggests that utilizing dP−KS may be undesirable for the group decision-
making context due to an associated systematic bias. Therein, it was shown
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that despite the aligned preferences of a large majority, a few judges with op-
posing preferences can dominate the resulting consensus ranking by simply
evaluating more objects.
The normalized projected Kemeny Snell distance, written here succinctly
as dNP−KS , was developed in [58] to overcome the aforementioned drawback
of dP−KS . The dNP−KS distance is equivalent to dKS when the inputs are
restricted to space ΩC , but it uniquely satisfies an intuitive set of axioms
desired of any distance defined in space Ω. The corresponding distance
function between a, b ∈ Ω is defined as:
dNP−KS(a, b) =
{
dKS(a|(Va ⋂Vb),b|(Va ⋂Vb))
n¯(n¯−1)/2 if n¯ ≥ 2,
0 otherwise,
(5)
where n¯ := |Va
⋂
Vb|. From its axiomatic foundation, dNP−KS gives equi-
table voting power to each input ranking or judge in the aggregation process.
Before proceeding, it is important to briefly review other distances de-
fined for incomplete rankings that do not conform with a neutral treatment
of incompleteness herein adopted. Expressly, these measures make explicit
or implicit assumptions about individual preferences over unevaluated ob-
jects. For instance, top-k ranking distances explicitly assume that an indi-
vidual’s (n−k) unranked objects are all tied for ordinal position k+1, making
them all strictly dispreferred to the k ranked objects (e.g., see [44, 54]). As
an additional example, a set of axioms and logical conditions were defined in
[63] for a distance that assigns numeric values to four preferential relation-
ships: preferred, dispreferred, indifferent, and incomparable. The distance
was extended to solve the aggregation problem in [37, 41]. Given two rank-
ings, the distance value is 5/3 when one ranking does not evaluate objects
vi, vj and another prefers vi over vj (or vice versa); if one ranking prefers vi
over vj and the other one prefers vj over vi, the distance value is 2. This is
to say that the former has 5/6 the weight of the latter implicitly (the corre-
sponding dP−KS or dNP−KS distance values are not comparable). Readers
are directed to [6, 7, 17, 42] for additional examples.
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3.2. Correlation coefficients
Correlation coefficients are an alternative methodology for comparing
rankings with an extensive history and wide array of applications in statis-
tical literature (e.g., [45, 47, 50, 61]). They have been more recently applied
to ranking aggregation [2, 23], where the agreement between judges a and b
is measured on the interval [−1, 1]; the minimum/maximum values indicate
complete disagreement/agreement. The most prominent is the Kendall τ
(tau) correlation coefficient [39], which is applicable for rankings in space
ΩC ∩ ΩS . In [40], it was expanded to rankings in ΩC as the τb correlation
coefficient. However, Emond and Mason [23] gave compelling evidence that
τb exhibits serious flaws including returning the undefined correlation of 0/0
when comparing the all-ties ranking to itself or to any other non-strict rank-
ing. To replace it, the authors introduced the τx (tau-extended) correlation
coefficient, which relies on the following ranking-matrix representation of
a ∈ ΩC , denoted as [aij ], with individual entries 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n given by:
aij =

1 if ai ≤ aj ,
−1 if ai > aj ,
0 if i = j.
(6)
Here, a tie connotes a positive statement of agreement; conversely, the τb
ranking-matrix (not shown) treats a tie as a declaration of indifference by
giving it a value of zero [23]. Applying Equation (6), the τx correlation
between a, b ∈ ΩC , with respective ranking-matrices [aij ] and [bij ], is given
by the function:
τx(a, b) =
∑n
i=1
∑n
j=1 aijbij
n(n− 1) . (7)
In [23], it was also proved that τx is connected to dKS via the equation:
τx(a, b) = 1− γ dKS(a, b)
n(n− 1) , (8)
where γ > 0 is the minimum dKS distance unit (see Equation (3)). This
connection renders τx with a similar axiomatic foundation as dKS . At the
same time, since the corresponding NIRA problems are also equivalent, it
suggests that the inadequacies of the latter to handle incomplete rankings
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[58] carry over to the former. The ensuing section will explore this premise.
We remark that alternative correlation coefficients have been defined
for the space of incomplete rankings using concepts from fuzzy set theory,
which deals with the representation of incomplete or vague information. In
this context, missing ranking values are expressed as an interval [66]—which
serves to estimate the missing or incomparable information. This treatment
is useful in various contexts and covered in various works (e.g., [27, 28, 29,
31]), but it does not conform with the neutral treatment highlighted in this
work. Therefore, it is not considered for the remainder of this paper.
4. Handling incomplete rankings via correlation coefficients
To the best of our knowledge, there has not been a ranking correlation
coefficient explicitly tailored to the space of non-strict incomplete rankings,
Ω, under a neutral treatment of incompleteness. Indeed, although [23] sug-
gested that τx could fulfill this extended role, this assertion has not been
formally proved nor empirically validated. Hence, the first of the ensuing
subsections examines this hypothesis. Then, §4.2 introduces the ranking
correlation coefficient τˆx, along with the properties and axioms it satisfies.
Finally, §4.3 establishes the equivalence of τˆx with the axiomatic distance
dNP−KS as well as the equivalence of τx with dP−KS when the input rank-
ings lie in space Ω. These connections are then leveraged into new exact
optimization methodologies for solving NIRA in §4.4.
4.1. Inadequacy of the Kendall Tau-Extended correlation coefficient
This subsection provides cogent evidence that τx is not an adequate mea-
sure for quantifying and aggregating differences between incomplete rank-
ings. Specifically, counter to what is claimed in [23], employing τx produces
incongruous and counterintuitive results when a judge’s unranked objects
should convey no preferential information. The veracity of these assertions
is established via intuitive examples and the accompanying discussion.
10
Input rankings τx−Optima
a1 a2 a3 a4 a5 a6 a7 a8 a9 a10 a11 r∗1 r
∗
2
O
b
je
c
ts
v1 1 1 • • • • • • • • 5 4 4
v2 2 2 1 1 • • • • • 1 4 5 5
v3 • • 2 2 1 1 1 • • • 3 2 1
v4 • • • • 2 2 2 1 1 • 2 3 2
v5 • • • • • • • 2 2 2 1 1 3
τx(r
∗
1 ,a
k) 0.1 0.1 −0.1 −0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 −0.1 −0.1 −0.1 0.6
τx(r
∗
2 ,a
k) 0.1 0.1 −0.1 −0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 −0.1 0.2
Table 1: Judge a11 wields outsize influence in the τx consensus rankings
Table 1 displays a simple instance consisting of incomplete rankings in
space Ω over object set V = {v1, . . . , v5}; underneath the table are the
underlying correlation values for each resulting optimal solution and each
input ranking. Since, for every pair of objects (vi, vi+1) more judges prefer vi
to vi+1 than the reverse, it is reasonable from the majority’s point of view to
expect the identity permutation 5 := (1, 2, 3, 4, 5) or a similar ranking as the
consensus solution—10 of 11 people collectively express this belief. However,
the τx-consensus rankings are r
∗
1 = (4, 5, 2, 3, 1) and r
∗
2 = (4, 5, 1, 2, 3), which
yield similarity values of τ(r∗1, 5) = −0.2 and τ(r∗2, 5) = −0.6, that is, they
are highly dissimilar from the majority’s preferences (by comparison, the all-
ties ranking has a correlation with 5 of 0). Notice that a
10 and a11 are the
only rankings that compare v2 and v5 and that, although a
10 strictly prefers
v2 over v5 and a
11 strictly prefers v5 over v2, the optimal solutions only
reflect the preferences of a11. More strikingly, v3 is strictly preferred over v2
in r∗1 and r∗2 even though two of the three judges who evaluate (v2, v3) express
the reverse preference. This suggests τx inadvertently imposes inequitable
voting power in the aggregation process, specifically benefiting rankings with
higher completeness (a11 in this example). Note that, in settings where
the number of items to evaluate is unrestricted (e.g., product and travel
ratings/reviews), awareness of this systematic biases could produce negative
incentives such as spamming [60].
The inadequacy of τx to handle incomplete rankings can be discerned
on a fundamental level from its inability to yield the extrema values 1 and
−1 when an incomplete ranking is compared with itself and with its reverse
ranking, respectively. In fact, the achievable correlation range shrinks as the
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number of ranked objects decreases. For instance, τx(a, b) = −13 when a =
(1, 2, •), b = (2, 1, •), but τx(a, b) = −14 when a = (1, 2, 3, •), b = (3, 2, 1, •).
This shrinking range translates into inequitability in the aggregation process.
In Table 1, for example, a1, a2, a5, a6 and a7 each obtain a τx correlation
value of 0.1 with r∗1 or r∗2 even though each perfectly agrees over its ranked
objects with both consensus rankings.
A countering opinion to the preceding argument is that the full correla-
tion range should not be achievable when comparing two incomplete rank-
ings since it is possible these could increase or decrease in similarity once
their preferences over all alternatives become known. However, this epis-
temic perspective of missing data does not align with the neutral treatment
adopted in this work, alternatively characterized as the ontic perspective [18].
The latter perspective more closely fits the purposes of this work since the
objective is to piece together only the explicit preferences from each input
so as to reach a solution that is equitable to each ranking input and repre-
sentative of the collective preferences. Inferences of the individual’s missing
preferences is covered in literature outside of the current scope (e.g., see
[25, 36]). We remark that a similar perspective regarding missing data is
adopted in [15, 22] in the distance-based context (see §3.1 for details).
4.2. Derivation of new correlation coefficient and its axiomatic foundation
To quantify the similarity between non-strict incomplete rankings via
correlation coefficients, a fundamental requirement is that the correlation
between any pair of rankings a, b ∈ Ω must lie within the interval [−1, 1].
The −1 and 1 values must be achieved whenever a and b completely agree
and completely disagree, respectively; otherwise, a value from the interior of
the interval should be returned commensurate with the level of similarity. As
explained in §4.1, τx cannot fulfill these essential requirements. Hence, this
subsection derives a new correlation coefficient that satisfies these properties
as well as a set of metric-like axioms tailored to space Ω. As a first step, we
define a new ranking-matrix [aij ] representation for a ∈ Ω as:
12
aij =

1 if ai ≤ aj ,
−1 if ai > aj ,
0 if i = j, or ai = •, or aj = •
(9)
where 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n. This ranking-matrix can be obtained by extending
Equation (6) to also assign aij = 0 whenever object i or j (or both) is
unranked in a and, thus, it is equivalent to the τx ranking-matrix when
the input rankings are complete. This extension was cursorily proposed
in [23], although it was neither explicitly defined nor implemented therein.
It is chosen as the basis of the new correlation coefficient also because its
treatment of ties is equivalent to the Kemeny Snell “half-flip” metric, which
assigns only half of a rank reversal between a and b whenever one ties (vi, vj)
but the other professes a strict preference for vi over vj , or vice versa.
As a second step, consider ranking-matrices [aij ] and [bij ] respectively
defined according to Equation (9) and their associated matrix inner product :
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
aijbij .
When a and b rank every object, the number of non-zeros in each ranking-
matrix and the maximum matrix inner product are both equal to n(n− 1).
The reasons are that the ranking-matrix diagonal elements are all 0 and that
aijbij = 1 for all i 6= j when bij = aij . It is also straightforward to discern
that a minimum matrix inner product of −n(n− 1) can be achieved only if
a does not contain ties and bij = −aij for all i 6= j.
When a or b does not rank every object, for each vi such that either
ai = • or bi = •, the ith ranking-matrix row and column are set to zero,
thereby decreasing the maximum and increasing the minimum matrix inner
products by 2(n − 1). Put otherwise, such a matrix inner product may be
calculated as if the ith row and column of both ranking-matrices do not
exist. Hence, the maximum and minimum inner products of [aij ] and [bij ]
are reduced to n¯(n¯ − 1) and −n¯(n¯ − 1), respectively, where n¯ = |Va
⋂
Vb|.
Accordingly, a new correlation function can be derived to achieve the full
expected correlation interval [−1, 1]. It is named the scaled Kendall tau-
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extended correlation coefficient, written succinctly as τˆx, and is defined as:
τˆx(a, b) =
∑n
i=1
∑n
j=1 aijbij
n¯(n¯− 1) , (10)
which may be rewritten in terms of τx via the equation:
τˆx(a, b) =
n(n− 1)
n¯(n¯− 1)τx(a, b), (11)
assuming the underlying ranking-matrix of τx is given by Equation (9).
This alternative expression emphasizes that, by scaling τx(a, b) by the fac-
tor n(n−1)n¯(n¯−1) ≥ 1, τˆx removes the impact of irrelevant pairwise preference
comparisons—the pairs of objects unranked by a or b—from their correla-
tion. As a result, the extrema correlation values −1 and 1 can be achieved
when comparing two appropriate non-strict incomplete rankings.
Clearly, when Va
⋂
Vb = V , the Equation (11) scaling factor equals 1,
meaning τˆx is equivalent to τx in space ΩC ; Furthermore, τˆx is equivalent to
τ in space ΩC ∩ ΩS due to the equivalence between τx and τ in said space
[23]. Hence, τˆx possesses the same advantages as τx and τ when the rankings
are restricted to spaces ΩC and ΩC∩ΩS , respectively. The remainder of this
subsection will provide a theoretical basis for why τˆx is uniquely suited to
deal with the broader space of non-strict incomplete rankings Ω; additional
practical reasons are given by the empirical results obtained in §5.2–§5.3.
This paragraph presents the set of intuitive metric-like axioms that τˆx
satisfies; formal proofs are in Appendix 7.1. To present the τˆx axiomatic
foundation, one concept must be introduced. Namely, b is said to be between
a and c if, for each (vi, vj), the preference judgment of b either (i) agrees
with a or (ii) agrees with c or (iii) a prefers vi, c prefers vj , and b ties them.
Axiom 1 (Relevance). The correlation discounts the unevaluated objects:
τˆx(a, b) = τˆx(a|(Va⋂Vb), b|(Va⋂Vb)).
Axiom 2 (Commutativity). The correlation value is independent of the
order in which a and b are compared:
τˆx(a, b) = τˆx(b,a).
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Axiom 3 (Neutrality). The correlation value is independent of the partic-
ular labeling of the objects:
If a′ = pi(a) and b′ = pi(b), then τˆx(a, b) = τˆx(a′, b′), where pi :=
{1, 2, ..., n} → {1, 2, ..., n} is a permutation function.
Axiom 4 (Reduction). If a and b agree except for a set V ′ ⊆ V , then
τˆx(a, b) may be computed by focusing only on the objects in V
′:
τˆx(a, b) = 1 + 2τˆx(a|V ′ , b|V ′).
Axiom 5 (Relaxed Triangle Inequality). Relationship among the three pos-
sible paired comparisons from three incomplete rankings:
τˆx(a|Va,b,c , b|Va,b,c) + τˆx(b|Va,b,c , c|Va,b,c) ≤ τˆx(a|Va,b,c , c|Va,b,c) + 1;
and equality holds if and only if b|Va,b,c is between the other two projected
rankings; here, Va,b,c := Va
⋂
Vb
⋂
Vc for concise representation.
Axiom 6 (Scaling). The correlation range is between -1 and 1, inclusively:
−1 ≤ τˆx(a, b) ≤ 1;
with τˆx(a, b) = 1 iff a|(Va⋂Vb) = b|(Va⋂Vb) and τˆx(a, b) = −1 iff b|(Va⋂Vb)
is the reverse ranking of a|(Va⋂Vb) (the latter must be a linear ordering).
Axiom 6 ensures equitability in the aggregation process regardless of
how many objects are ranked by each judge. It also brings the pragmatic
benefit of eliminating the unenforceable/unrealistic requirement of having
to allocate an equal number of objects for each judge to evaluate, which
may be difficult to enforce due to differing expertise, disagreeing schedules,
unplanned exemptions, etc. [35]. Indeed, it is advisable to avoid assigning
fewer subjective evaluation tasks to mitigate cognitive errors [4, 64]
As suggested by Axiom 1, the τˆx similarity between two incomplete rank-
ings can be equivalently calculated by simply dropping the alternatives un-
ranked by either ranking (i.e., by projecting them to the subset of objects
evaluated by both). While this may seem to remove the incomplete data
from the researcher’s view when comparing two incomplete rankings, we
emphasize that the consensus ranking problem (see (1) or (2)) involves ac-
cruing the comparisons between the candidate solution (always a complete
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ranking) and each input ranking (which may be incomplete or complete). In
this context, Axiom 1 ensures that each input incomplete ranking influences
only the consensus ranking elements corresponding to its ranked objects.
4.3. Key pairings between distances and correlation coefficients
This subsection establishes a formal connection between τˆx and dNP−KS
as well as between another key axiomatic-distance and correlation-coefficient
pairing in space Ω. Together these results fill a significant gap in the
literature because although [23] made a connection between distance and
correlation-based methods for complete rankings (see Equation (8)), they
conjectured that a parallel connection could not be established for incom-
plete rankings. Proofs to all related theorems and corollaries are in §7.2.
Theorem 1 (Linear transformation between τˆx and dNP−KS). Let a and
b be arbitrary rankings over n = |V | objects drawn from the space of non-
strict incomplete rankings, Ω. Then, the τˆx correlation coefficient and the
dNP−KS distance are connected through the equation:
dNP−KS(a, b) =
1
2
− 1
2
τˆx(a, b). (12)
Theorem 2 (Linear transformation between τx and dP−KS). Let a and b be
arbitrary rankings of n = |V | objects from space Ω. Then, the τx correlation
coefficient and the dP−KS distance are connected through the equation:
dP−KS(a, b) =
n¯(n¯− 1)
4
− n(n− 1)
4
τx(a, b), (13)
where n¯ = |Va
⋂
Vb| (i.e., the number of objects ranked by both a and b).
The following two corollaries are a direct result of these connections.
Corollary 1. The NIRA optimization problems typified by τˆx and dNP−KS
are equivalent and, thus, provide identical consensus rankings. Similarly,
the NIRA optimization problems typified by τx and dP−KS are equivalent.
Corollary 2. The correlation-based NIRA is NP-hard.
16
The distance-correlation pairings provide mutal support for the useful-
ness of the respective measures. In particular, τ , τx, and τˆx are strengthened
by the robust properties and social choice foundations of the Kemeny aggre-
gation framework (see [8, 38, 69, 70]). Meanwhile, dKS , dP−KS , and dNP−KS
benefit from the computational advantages engendered by the correlation-
based framework, which include a linearized NIRA objective function. These
advantages are bolstered by the optimization methodologies developed in the
next subsection.
4.4. Exact optimization methodologies
Emond and Mason [23] devised a branch and bound algorithm for solv-
ing the ranking aggregation problem that relies on a succinct function of
cumulative agreement between the set of input rankings {ak}Kk=1 and an
iteratively evolving candidate-solution vector r ∈ ΩC . In this respect τx
offers a significant advantage over its distance counterpart dP−KS since:
K∑
k=1
τx(r,a
k) =
K∑
k=1
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
akijrij
n(n− 1) =
1
n(n− 1)
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
Aijrij , (14)
where [akij ] and [rij ] represent the ranking-matrices of a
k and r, respectively;
and where [Aij ] =
∑K
k=1 a
k
ij is defined as the combined ranking-matrix (CR).
Once the CR is computed, the number of matrix inner products required
to calculate the objective function value of a candidate solution is reduced
from K to one. Conversely, the cumulative distance function for dP−KS (or
for dKS or dNP−KS) does not yield as wieldy of an expression due to the
presence of nonlinear terms. CR’s computational advantage thus enables a
form of sensitivity analysis used in the B&B algorithm for determining the
increase/decrease in cumulative agreement that results when the preference
or ordinal relationships of a few objects in a candidate ranking are altered.
Since each correlation coefficient term τˆx(r,a
k) in the τˆx NIRA objec-
tive function has a different denominator—based on the number of objects
ranked by ak—CR and the Emond and Mason B&B algorithm are inapplica-
ble for τˆx. To fix this issue, the following theorem introduces a corresponding
succinct function of cumulative agreement (see 7.2 for its proof).
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Theorem 3 (Succinct function of cumulative agreement for τˆx). Let r ∈
ΩC , a
k ∈ Ω, and n¯k = |Vak | (the number of objects ranked by ak), for
k = 1, . . . ,K. Then, the τˆx cumulative correlation between r and {ak}Kk=1
can be computed according to the function:
K∑
k=1
τˆx(r,a
k) =
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
Aˆijrij , (15)
where [Aˆij ] :=
∑K
k=1
akij
n¯k(n¯k−1) is the scaled combined ranking-matrix (SCR).
Based on this expression, it is possible to extend the specialized branch
and bound algorithm from [23] to find the comprehensive solution to NIRA.
The resulting B&B algorithm returns the complete NIRA optimality set
through an efficient exploration of the solution space, whereby unpromising
branches (i.e., ordinal combinations) are pruned to avoid enumeration. Fol-
lowing the calculations of [Aˆij ] and [Aij ], the steps of the B&B algorithms
for τˆx and τx are identical. For the reader’s convenience, a flowchart and
detailed description of the NIRA B&B algorithm are given in Appendix 7.3.
The combination of Theorems 1-3 and Corollary 1 enable the formulation
of the first exact integer programming models for NIRA. In particular, Yoo
and Escobedo [68] recently derived a set of linear constraints that imposes
logical conditions for a matrix of decision variables R ∈ {−1, 0, 1}n×n to
induce all ranking-matrices of non-strict complete rankings (see Equation
(6)). The feasible solutions to these constraints reflect all possibilities for the
solution vector r ∈ ΩC and, hence, they can be paired with Expression (14)
or (15) to solve the NIRA via τx (equivalent to dP−KS) or via τˆx (equivalent
to dNP−KS) respectively. While these formulations are faster to solve than
B&B, they are guaranteed to return only one optimal solution. As such,
they are not suited for the computational studies herein conducted. For the
reader’s convenience, the NIRA formulation for τˆx is given in Appendix 7.4.
5. Computational studies on the correlation-based NIRA
This section seeks to assess the comparative abilities of τx and τˆx to be
decisive and electorally fair. The decisiveness property—characterized by
the propensity to yield unique or few alternative optima—is pivotal because
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many competitive group decision-making scenarios entail the allocation of a
limited budget among a subset of participants proportional to the consen-
sus ranking solution. In these situations, it is prudent to obtain the full set
of alternative optimal solutions when the consensus ranking is not unique.
Reporting only one consensus in these cases would engender unfair and/or
arbitrary outcomes. However, by Corollary 2, obtaining even just one con-
sensus ranking via correlation-based methods (or the equivalent axiomatic
distance-based methods [3]) is an NP-hard problem. What is more, since
|Ω| ≈ .5[(1.4)n+1n!]  n! [26], enumerating the full solution space is im-
practical except for a very small number of objects—for n = 10 and n = 20,
there are approximately 1× 109 and 2.5× 1021 solutions, respectively. The
electoral fairness property is a central democratic tenet in social choice. Be-
cause each judge wishes the consensus ranking to be as close as possible
to his/her preferences [13], ranking aggregation methods should maximize
the agreement of the solution with as many of the inputs as possible to be
equitable. This property is assessed by measuring the similarity between
the consensus ranking to an underlying ground truth shared by a majority.
To evaluate both properties empirically, the ensuing subsection develops a
probabilistic approach for generating instances from space Ω.
5.1. Generation of representative instances from space Ω
In the computational study carried out in [58], dNP−KS outperformed
dP−KS in yielding fewer alternative optima when solving instances with
“predictable consensus rankings” of the distance-based NIRA. Although
these results seem to support the premise that τˆx is better suited than τx to
solve the correlation-based NIRA (due to Corollary 1), their scope is limited
based on the restrictive types of instances therein considered. Specifically,
since enumeration was employed to solve the problems exactly, each tested
instance consisted of at most 15 non-strict incomplete rankings of dimension
n = 7. These were generated from three simplistic templates. The first two
initialize every input to a reference ranking a ∈ ΩC—the all-ties ranking
and the identity permutation, n, respectively—and a third differs slightly
from the second in that it initializes a minority of inputs to the reverse rank-
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ing of n. For all three templates, incompleteness is inserted to a random
number and selection of objects within each initialized ranking. The in-
corporated level of individual agreement/disagreement of these instances is
extreme and, thus, uncharacteristic of most group decision-making settings.
To generate test instances that are representative of different group
decision-making scenarios, we devise a sampling approach based on Mallow’s
φ-model of ranking data [53], which is tailored to distance-based methods
[55]. The standard φ-model is parameterized by a reference or “ground
truth” ranking a ∈ ΩC and dispersion φ ∈ (0, 1] which, in conjunction with
the dKS distance, quantify the probability of observing a ranking a ∈ ΩC
as:
P (a) = P (a|a, φ) = 1
Z
φdKS(a,a),
where Z = Σr∈ΩCφ
dKS(r,a) = (1)×(1+φ)×(1+φ+φ2)×· · ·×(1+· · ·+φn−1)
is the normalization constant. Since setting φ to 1 yields the uniform distri-
bution over space ΩC and setting it nearer to 0 centers the distribution mass
closer to a, the dispersion parameter effectively characterizes the proximity
of a to a [51]. Note that fixing the same dispersion value to generate all
input rankings of an instance will yield rankings that have approximately
the same degree of similarity with a. Instances with lower (higher) φ values
will yield instances that are more (less) cohesive collectively. Put otherwise,
higher φ values will generate non-trivial instances with higher noise levels.
Since sampling directly from the φ-distribution can be very inefficient,
we adapt the repeated insertion model (RIM) developed in [21] for the ef-
ficient unconditional sampling of non-strict incomplete rankings. On a re-
lated note, we do not use the Generalized RIM model [51] since it is a
conditional approach that relies on assumptions that are more appropriate
for implicitly gathered choice data. In RIM, a set of specified insertion
probabilities pij for 1 ≤ j ≤ i ≤ n is used to efficiently construct a random
ranking a from the reference ranking a ∈ ΩC . Specifically, assuming objects
a−1(1), . . . ,a−1(i − 1) have been assigned certain ranking positions within
a, where a−1(j) is a function that returns the jth-highest ranked object in a
(see Appendix 7.3 for more details). Object a−1(i) is then inserted at rank
j ≤ i (i.e., assigned position j in a) with probability pij , for i = 1, . . . , n. The
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choice of insertion probabilities pij=φ
i−j/(1+φ+ · · ·+φi−1) guarantees that∑i
j=1 pij = 1 for all i, and it induces the standard Mallows φ-distribution
[21]. To generate incomplete rankings by a similar procedure, we propose
two natural extensions for RIM. With this intent in mind, assume that the
object subset to be ranked by a, Va, is known a priori. Pseudocodes of
these insertion models, abbreviated as RIME1 and RIME2, are shown in
Algorithms 1 and 2.
Algorithm 1 Repeated Insertion Model Extension #1 (RIME1)
Input: Object set for a: Va, projected reference object ordering: a
−1|Va , dispersion: φ
Output: Generated incomplete ranking subsample
1: for i = 1, 2, ..., |Va| do
2: for j = 1, 2, ..., i do
3: a−1j ← a−1i |Va with probability: pij = φi−j/(1 + φ+ · · ·+ φi−1)
4: for i = 1, 2, ..., |V | do
5: if vi ∈ Va then
6: ai ← rank position of vi in a−1
7: else
8: ai ← •
Algorithm 2 Repeated Insertion Model Extension #2 (RIME2)
Input: Object set for a: Va, reference object ordering: a
−1, dispersion: φ
Output: Generated incomplete ranking subsample
1: for i = 1, 2, ..., |V | do
2: for j = 1, 2, ..., i do
3: a−1j ← a−1i with probability: pij = φi−j/(1 + φ+ · · ·+ φi−1)
4: for i = 1, 2, ..., |V | do
5: if vi ∈ Va then
6: ai ← rank position of vi in a−1
7: else
8: ai ← •
Explored in greater detail, RIME1 applies RIM to generate a rank-
ing over Va belonging to the Mallows φ-distribution parameterized by pair
(a|Va , φ), which is then expanded to V by setting the positions of unranked
objects to •. RIME2 applies RIM to generate a complete ranking over V
belonging to the Mallows φ-distribution parameterized by pair (a, φ), which
is then converted into an incomplete ranking by keeping the numerical val-
ues of only the objects in Va (i.e., replacing the positions of all other objects
with •). To explain the differences between RIME1 and RIME2 more intu-
itively, assume that in a, object vi ∈ V is strictly preferred over all objects
21
in a nonempty subset V ′ ⊂ V , all of which are in turn strictly preferred over
object vj ∈ V . That is, in the ground truth, vi is strictly preferred over vj
and V ′ are objects with intermediary ordinal positions. The core distinc-
tion between the two insertion models is that, as the subset of unranked
objects (i.e., V ′) for a given judge increases in size, RIME2 proportionally
decreases the probability that the reference ordinal positions for vi and vj
will be reversed in a. Conversely, RIME1 determines the probability of this
event as if vi and vj have consecutive ordinal positions in a, thus ignoring
the reference positions of unranked objects. In other words, unlike RIME1,
RIME2 implicitly incorporates a relative “intensity of preference” [14, 16]
between vi and vj that reflects the intermediary ordinal positions a assigns
to V ′ even though this subset is not explicitly considered by a. Hence, the
two insertion models generate non-strict incomplete ranking instances from
opposing viewpoints regarding preferences over unranked objects. Although
these models do not capture every possible assumption for such preferences,
they can be utilized to generate nontrivial random instances with control-
lable degrees of collective similarity from which general conclusions about
the behavior of individual ranking measures can be drawn. It is important
to mention that alternative sampling approaches and specialized distribu-
tions of ranking data could also be extended to generate random instances
of incomplete rankings (e.g., the Plackett-Luce model [52, 62]). A thorough
comparison of these alternatives and a formal analysis of the statistical dis-
tributions induced by RIME1 and RIME2 are left for future work.
5.2. Assessing decisiveness
This subsection concentrates on assessing the desired practical property
of decisiveness. The property is especially relevant owing to the fact that
ranking aggregation algorithms are typically designed to yield only one of an
instance’s possible multiple rankings, for the sake of efficiency. (For instance,
[58] devised an exact algorithm for dNP−KS based on the implicit hitting
set approach [59] that returns exactly one optimal solution in ΩC ∩ ΩS).
Thus, even though obtaining more than one optimal solution or certifying
unique optimality may be infeasible in practice, it would be reassuring for
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decision makers to know a priori that certain robust measures tend to return
relatively fewer alternative optimal solutions than others. Accordingly, the
decisiveness of τx and τˆx is assessed by how each measure curtails the growth
in the number of alternative optimal solutions as data becomes noisier. To
this end, this section performs experiments on random instances generated
with RIME1 and RIME2 and characterized according to the four simple
real-world group decision-making scenarios described in Table 2.
Table 2: Characterization of rankings generated from one ground truth and one dispersion
φ (Dispersion) General group characterization Example scenarios
φ ∈ (0, 0.25] Strong collective similarity
“Subject-matter experts”
• Federal grant proposal reviews
• Olympic events with a style component
• Standardized test essay grading
Low
s
u
b
je
c
t
iv
it
y
φ ∈ (0.25, 0.50] Weak collective similarity
“Seasoned body of objective observers”
• University rankings
• Paid movie critiques
• Official World Cup ranking forecasts
φ ∈ (0.50, 0.75] Weak collective dissimilarity
“Public with background information”
• Unpaid movie recommendations
• Unsponsored top travel lists
• Car brand preferences
φ ∈ (0.75, 1] Strong collective dissimilarity
“Jumble of heterogeneous opinions”
• Favorite colors
• Luckiest numbers
High
For the parameter configurations detailed below, the number of alterna-
tive optima returned by each correlation coefficient is individually recorded
for 10 corresponding instances and summarized via average (AVG) and stan-
dard deviation (SD) values (graphs display AVG and AVG±SD values via
error bars). Test problems are solved exactly via B&B (see Appendix 7.3)
until the full solution space is fathomed. Since B&B follows a nearly iden-
tical logic when executed with τx or τˆx and run-time decisions are instance-
specific, differences in solution times were insufficiently favorable in either
direction and are unrecorded. For a more efficient version of B&B, which has
been shown to provide good quality solutions, but which does not guarantee
global optimality nor return alternative optima, see [2].
All experiments were performed on machines equipped with 22GB of
RAM memory shared by two 2.8 GHz quad core Intel Xeon 5560 processors;
code was written in Python.
The first set of instances is guided by the scenarios characterized in
Table 2. To obtain data with differing noise levels, each instance generates
K = 100 total rankings via RIME1 or RIME2 using single-dispersion values
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(a) RIME1 Instances with |V | = 8
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(b) RIME2 Instances with |V | = 8
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(c) RIME1 Instances with |V | = 12
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(d) RIME2 Instances with |V | = 12
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(e) RIME1 Instances with |V | = 16
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(f) RIME2 Instances with |V | = 16
Figure 1: τx evinces much less decisiveness than τˆx as the input rankings become noisier
φ ∈ {0.05, 0.1, . . . , 0.95, 1.00} (five φ values per group characterization in
Table 2); without loss of generality, the ground truth a is set to n (the
identity permutation) in all these instances. Prior to generating a set of
input rankings {ak}Kk=1, the object subset ranked by each ak, Vak ⊆ V , is
determined randomly along with its cardinality |Vak | ≤ n = |V |, which is
drawn from the uniform distribution U(l, u). Different sizes of V and Vak are
tested for k = 1, . . .K, namely |V | = 8 with |Vak | ∼ U(2, 6), |V | = 12 with
|Vak | ∼ U(3, 9), and |V | = 16 with |Vak | ∼ U(4, 12). These combinations
are chosen to reflect realistic scenarios in which judges evaluate uneven but
reasonable numbers of objects. For instance, it is unreasonable for most
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humans to objectively rank a large fraction of objects when |V | = 16.
Figures 1a, 1c, 1e for RIME1 and Figures 1b, 1d, 1f for RIME2 sum-
marize the results graphically (to distinguish the measures visually, τx lines
are gray and thick and τˆx lines are blue and dotted). We point out that
when |V | ≥ 16 and φ > .75, some instances could not finish solving within
24 hours or their B&B trees exceeded memory. Therefore, the horizontal
axes of Figures 1e and 1f stop at φ = .75. These plots demonstrate that τˆx
attained a lower AVG number of alternative optima than τx for nearly all
of the tested φ. When φ > .35, τx AVG and SD values began to increase
considerably. For example, they reached respective values of 42.2 and 115.7
in Figure 1c and 5.8 and 6.1 in Figure 1d. Conversely, τˆx AVG and SD
values were never more than 2 and 2.5 in all the instances. Thus, while the
ability of both measures to obtain a unique optimal solution decreased as φ
and |V | increased, the growth in magnitude and variability in the number
of alternative optimal solutions was markedly less pronounced with τˆx.
5.3. Assessing electoral fairness
As discussed in §4.2, τˆx is designed to assign equitable voting power to
each individual judge (i.e., to enforce electoral fairness) in the aggregation,
whereas τx seems to provide increased representation to judges who evaluate
more objects (see §4.1). To gauge the impact of this fundamental difference,
a new set of instances is constructed. In particular, Table 2 describes sce-
narios where more than one group participates, which is reflected by using
multiple ground truths or ranges of φ to generate problem instances.
Table 3: Complex scenarios constructed from multiple ground truths or dispersions
Sampling parameters Generated instance description
(1−α)×100% of input rankings generated
with (a, φ1 ∈ (0, 0.25])
α×100% of input rankings generated with
(a, φ2 ∈ (0.75, 1])
A [(1−α)×100]%-majority hold nearly identical opinions, which
are close to ground truth a, while a [α × 100]%-minority have
nearly arbitrary opinions (i.e., with very low collective similar-
ity), where 0 < α < .5
(1−α)×100% of input rankings generated
with (a, φ ∈ (0, 0.25])
α×100% of input rankings generated with
(a′, φ ∈ (0, 0.25])
A [(1−α)×100]%-majority hold nearly identical opinions, which
are close to ground truth a, while a [α×100]%-minority seeks to
distort the outcome through cohesive contrarian opinions (i.e.,
close to ground truth a′), where 0 < α < .5.
The generated instances are guided by the Table 3 characterizations.
The first portion of these instances is generated with ground truth a = n
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and two dispersion parameters φ1 ∈ {0.05, 0.1, 0.15, 0.2, 0.25} and φ2 ∈
{0.8, 0.85, 0.9, 0.95, 1} associated with a majority of experts and a minority
of spammers (i.e., with jumbled heterogeneous opinions), respectively. The
second portion of these instances is generated via a single dispersion param-
eter φ ∈ {0.05, 0.1, 0.15, 0.2, 0.25}, which is used to draw both a majority
of expert rankings with ground truth a = n and a minority of contrar-
ian rankings with the reverse ground truth a′. Tested minority proportions
are α ∈ {0.05, 0.10, 0.15, 0.20}. For all of these instances we set K = 50,
|V | = 12, and |Vak | ∼ U(3, 6) for k = 1, . . . , b(1− α)Kc, where the latter is
used to draw the number of objects ranked by the majority.
The experiment tests two factors. First, it tests gradually increasing the
uniform distribution minimum (l) and maximum (u) parameters from 3 to
6 and from 6 to 9, respectively, for drawing the number of objects ranked
by the minority. That is, the distribution of |Vak | changes from U(3, 6) to
U(6, 9) for k = b(1 − α)Kc + 1, . . .K. Second, it tests the effect of com-
posing the minority with spammers versus contrarians, where the minority
proportions tested are α ∈ {0.05, 0.10, 0.15, 0.20}. To test these factors,
the experiment calculates the average Solution to Ground-truth Similarity
(AVG SGS), i.e., the average τˆx correlation between each unique or alterna-
tive optimal solution and a. Note that τˆx can be confidently used for this
purpose since the aggregate rankings and the ground truth are complete—
that is, τx and τˆx are interchangeable for this calculation (see §4.3). Since
the performance of τx was more unstable for RIME1 instances (see Figure
1), the remaining experiments consider only RIME2 instances.
Figure 2 shows that the aggregate rankings obtained with τx yield smaller
AVG SGS for minorities of contrarians. This occurs because contrarians hold
the reverse ground truth, which makes it difficult to get close to the ma-
jority’s ground truth. Moreover, as the number of objects that contrarians
evaluate increases, the average SGS decreases in Figure 2; in the worst case
observed, AVG SGS becomes as low as 0.65, which occurs when α = 0.20
and U(6, 9) for the number of objects ranked by the minority. Whereas a
minority of contrarians results in much smaller average SGS values for τx
compared with τˆx, a minority of spammers causes a less pronounced dif-
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Figure 2: The similarity between the τx optimal rankings and the expert’s ground truth
decreases sharply when a fixed minority of contrarians ranks more objects
ference. This is because spammers do not have strong cohesiveness among
them, meaning they cannot affect the aggregate ranking as strongly. On the
other hand, even if the percentage of contrarians is small, this causes the τx
aggregate rankings to get further from the experts’ ground truth. Thus, due
to the implicit systematic bias induced by τx, a higher number of objects
ranked by a minority of contrarians can significantly affect fairness in the
aggregation process as the resulting solutions get unreasonably far from the
majority of experts’ ground truth.
Notice that as the minimum and maximum parameters increase from
U(3, 6) to U(6, 9) and the minority proportion remains fixed, AVG SGS
decreases. In particular, the bottom-left of Figure 2 shows that AVG SGS for
τx decreased by more than 0.25 for a minority of contrarians with fixed α. In
contrast, the corresponding AVG SGS values for τˆx remained close to 1 and
relatively stable in the bottom-right of Figure 2. This result indicates that
τˆx is a more robust measure than τx for such types of nontrivial instances
since it is not as adversely affected by judges who evaluate more alternatives.
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6. Discussion
This work makes several contributions to the area of robust ranking
aggregation. Principally, it develops the τˆx ranking correlation coefficient,
which fulfills the standard definitions of statistical correlation in the space of
non-strict incomplete rankings. This ranking measure is applicable to situa-
tions where no assumptions should be made regarding individual preferences
over unranked objects. Its formal derivation and axiomatic foundation en-
sure that τˆx assigns equitable voting power to each input ranking in the ag-
gregation process, irrespective of the number of objectives it ranks. By also
connecting τˆx with dNP−KS , this work enhances distance and correlation-
based robust methodologies for ranking aggregation including the develop-
ment of expedient optimization methodologies. The paper also develops a
statistical sampling framework for generating non-trivial instances of the
non-strict incomplete ranking aggregation problem.
In this research, ranking aggregation is applied to find the mathemati-
cal consensus between a set of subjective preferences. However, the rank-
ing aggregation problem has wide-ranging applicability. In particular, the
mathematical approach herein designed may be of use in numerous contexts
where sets of incomplete ordinal data are compared to a “gold standard”
[67] or aggregated to derive robust measures of central tendency [22]. For
instance, the neutral treatment of incomplete rankings is relevant for the
integration of omics-scale data in Biostatistics, where rank-based methods
have been utilized due to their invariance to transformation and normaliza-
tion [48]. Within this context, it is often necessary to integrate ranked lists
of genes arising from multiple technology platforms or studies, each of which
may have access to overlapping yet differing parts of the genome. To avoid
obtaining suboptimal results and introducing noise/bias to the aggregation,
one must factor in the different underlying spaces of each list and ensure no
assumptions are made about the genes outside each respective space [49].
For future work, we plan to extend and tailor the present framework to some
of these applications. We will also analyze the properties of other plausible
statistical distributions for sampling non-strict incomplete rankings.
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7. Appendix
7.1. Proofs of axiomatic foundation for τˆx
This subsection proves that the scaled Kendall-tau correlation coefficient
τˆx satisfies Axiom 1-6 in §4.3.
Axiom 1 (Relevance). The correlation discounts the unevaluated objects:
τˆx(a, b) = τˆx(a|(Va⋂Vb), b|(Va⋂Vb)).
Proof. From the definition of τˆx in Equation (10), the ranking-matrix el-
ements for unevaluated objects are assigned to be 0 and, thus, the corre-
sponding numerator terms aijbij become 0. Therefore, it is valid to calculate
the correlation coefficient by focusing on the mutually evaluated objects.
Axiom 2 (Commutativity). The correlation value is independent of the
order in which a and b are compared:
τˆx(a, b) = τˆx(b,a)
Proof. From the definition of τˆx, we can write the following equations:
τˆx(a, b) =
∑n
i=1
∑n
j=1 aijbij
n¯(n¯− 1)
=
∑n
i=1
∑n
j=1 bijaij
n¯(n¯− 1)
= τˆx(b,a) 
Axiom 3 (Neutrality) The correlation value is independent of the partic-
ular labeling of the objects:
If a′ = pi(a) and b′ = pi(b), then τˆx(a, b) = τˆx(a′, b′), where pi is a
permutation function such that pi : {1, 2, ..., n} → {1, 2, ..., n}.
Proof. Without loss of generality, assume that only two objects are per-
muted at a time, namely the k-th and l-th objects, with k < l. Let A = [aij ]
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and B = [bij ] be the pre-permutation ranking-matrices corresponding to
ranking a and b, which are illustrated as:
A =

a11 · · · a1k · · · a1l · · · a1n
...
...
... · · · ... · · · ...
ak1 · · · akk · · · akl · · · akn
...
...
... · · · ... · · · ...
al1 · · · alk · · · all · · · aln
...
...
... · · · ... · · · ...
an1 · · · ank · · · anl · · · ann

B =

b11 · · · b1k · · · b1l · · · b1n
...
...
... · · · ... · · · ...
bk1 · · · bkk · · · bkl · · · bkn
...
...
... · · · ... · · · ...
bl1 · · · blk · · · bll · · · bln
...
...
... · · · ... · · · ...
bn1 · · · bnk · · · bnl · · · bnn

.
Let a′ and b′ be the post-permutation rankings with corresponding ranking-
matrices A′ = [a′ij ] and B
′ = [b′ij ], which are illustrated as:
A′ =

a11 · · · a1l · · · a1k · · · a1n
...
...
... · · · ... · · · ...
al1 · · · all · · · alk · · · aln
...
...
... · · · ... · · · ...
ak1 · · · akl · · · akk · · · akn
...
...
... · · · ... · · · ...
an1 · · · anl · · · ank · · · ann

B′ =

b11 · · · b1l · · · b1k · · · b1n
...
...
... · · · ... · · · ...
bl1 · · · bll · · · blk · · · bln
...
...
... · · · ... · · · ...
bk1 · · · bkl · · · bkk · · · bkn
...
...
... · · · ... · · · ...
bn1 · · · bnl · · · bnk · · · bnn

.
Note that unshaded elements in A′ and B′ remain the same after permuta-
tion (i.e., aij = a
′
ij for i, j 6= k, l). Since the k-th row (column) and l-th row
(column) of A and B are exchanged, the remaining entries are given by:
a′kk = all, a
′
ll = akk, a
′
ik = ail, a
′
il = aik, a
′
ki = ali, a
′
li = aki (16)
for every i 6= k, l (the new entries for b are defined similarly). The per-
mutation will affect only the numerator of τˆx(a, b) (see Equation (6)). In
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particular, by using Expression (16), the following equations can be derived:
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
aijbij =
n∑
i6=k,l
n∑
j 6=k,l
aijbij+
∑
j 6=k,l
(akjbkj+aljblj)+
∑
i 6=k,l
(aikbik+ailbil)+
∑
i=k,l
∑
j=k,l
aijbij
=
n∑
i 6=k,l
n∑
j 6=k,l
a′ijb
′
ij+
∑
j 6=k,l
(a′ljb
′
lj+a
′
kjb
′
kj)+
∑
i 6=k,l
(a′ilb
′
il+a
′
ikb
′
ik)+
∑
i=k,l
∑
j=k,l
a′jib
′
ji
=
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
a′ijb
′
ij .
Therefore, τˆx(a, b) = τˆx(a
′, b′). Since any permutation can be described
as a sequence of permutations of two objects at a time, τˆx(a, b) = τˆx(a
′, b′)
holds for any permutation pi.
Axiom 4 (Reduction). If a and b agree except for a set V ′ ⊆ V , τˆx(a, b)
may be computed by focusing only on the objects in V ′:
τˆx(a, b) = 1 + 2τˆx(a
′, b′).
where a′ = a|V ′ and b′ = b|V ′ , which are the rankings projected to the
objects in V ′.
Proof. By definition of the ranking-matrix representation of τˆx, if rankings
a and b have positive agreement for objects vi, vj (i.e., one prefers vi over
vj and the other also prefers vi over vj , or both tie vi and vj), the corre-
sponding numerator aijbij becomes 1. Otherwise, aijbij becomes -1. Let pc
be the number of pairs in concordance and pdc be the number of pairs in
discordance. Then, n¯(n¯ − 1) = 2pc + 2pdc because there are two elements
of ranking-matrix for vi and vj , aij and aji (bij and bji, respectively). The
calculation of τˆx can be decomposed as follows:∑n
i=1
∑n
j=1 aijbij
n¯(n¯− 1) =
1
n¯(n¯− 1) × 2pc +
−1
n¯(n¯− 1) × 2pdc.
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By replacing 2pc with n¯(n¯− 1)− 2pdc,∑n
i=1
∑n
j=1 aijbij
n¯(n¯− 1) =
1
n¯(n¯− 1) × (n¯(n¯− 1)− 2pdc) +
−1
n¯(n¯− 1) × 2pdc
= 1− 2
n¯(n¯− 1) × 2pdc
= 1 +
2
∑n
i=1
∑n
j=1 a
′
ijb
′
ij
n¯(n¯− 1)
Hence, if a and b agree except for a set V ′ ⊆ V , then τˆx can be calculated
by focusing on the objects where a and b disagree. That is,
τˆx(a, b) = 1 + 2τˆx(a
′, b′) 
Axiom 5 (Relaxed Triangle Inequality). Relationship among the three
possible paired comparisons from three incomplete rankings:
τˆx(a|Va,b,c , b|Va,b,c) + τˆx(b|Va,b,c , c|Va,b,c) ≤ τˆx(a|Va,b,c , c|Va,b,c) + 1;
and equality holds if and only if b|Va,b,c is between the other two projected
rankings; here, Va,b,c := Va
⋂
Vb
⋂
Vc for concise representation.
Proof. Let n¯ = |Va,b,c|. To investigate the relationship between τˆx(a, b),
τˆx(b, c), and τˆx(a, c), begin by writing their corresponding definitions:
τˆx(a, b) =
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
aijbij
n¯(n¯− 1) , τˆx(b, c) =
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
bijcij
n¯(n¯− 1) , τˆx(a, c) =
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
aijcij
n¯(n¯− 1) .
From these definitions, we can form the expression:
τˆx(a, b) + τˆx(b, c) =
∑n
i=1
∑n
j=1 bij(aij + cij)
n¯(n¯− 1) .
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There are three possibilities for the sum and product of aij and cij :
1) aij = cij = 1 =⇒ aij + cij = 2, aijcij = 1
2) aij = 1, cij = −1, or aij = −1, cij = 1 =⇒ aij + cij = 0, aijcij = −1
3) aij = cij = −1 =⇒ aij + cij = −2, aijcij = 1
Now, when b|Va,b,c is between the other two projected rankings (i.e., bij
is equal to either aij or cij or both, or bij may also equal 1 when aij and bij
disagree), bij can be determined from the values of aij and cij as follows:
1) aij = cij = 1 =⇒ bij = 1
2) aij = 1, cij = −1, or aij = −1, cij = 1 =⇒ bij = 1 or − 1
3) aij = cij = −1 =⇒ bij = −1
Referencing the above cases, if b|Va,b,c is between the other two projected
rankings, the following equality always holds for each i, j:
bij(aij + cij) = aijcij + 1. (17)
Therefore, summing over all i, j yields the following inequality:
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
bij(aij + cij) =
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
aijcij + n¯(n¯− 1). (18)
By a similar analysis, if b|Va,b,c is not between the other two projected rank-
ings,
bij(aij + cij) < aijcij + 1, (19)
and summing over all i, j yields the following inequality:
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
bij(aij + cij) <
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
aijcij + n¯(n¯− 1). (20)
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Combining equations (18) and (20) yields the inequality:
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
bij(aij + cij) ≤
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
aijcij + n¯(n¯− 1).
Therefore, dividing by n¯(n¯− 1), we obtain the desired expression.
Axiom 6 (Scaling). The correlation range is between -1 and 1, inclusively:
−1 ≤ τˆx(a, b) ≤ 1;
with τˆx(a, b) = 1 iff a|(Va⋂Vb) = b|(Va⋂Vb) and τˆx(a, b) = −1 iff b|(Va⋂Vb)
is the reverse ranking of a|(Va⋂Vb) (the latter must be a linear ordering).
Proof. (⇐) Assume a|(Va⋂Vb) and b|(Va⋂Vb) are the same ranking. Then,
τˆx(a, b) =
∑n
i=1
∑n
j=1 aijbij
n¯(n¯− 1) =
∑n
i=1
∑n
j=1 aijaij
n¯(n¯− 1) =
n¯(n¯− 1)
n¯(n¯− 1) = 1.
If b|(Va⋂Vb) is the reverse ranking of a|(Va⋂Vb) and b|(Va⋂Vb) and a|(Va⋂Vb)
are linear orderings, then bij always has the opposite value of aij . That is,
bij = −aij , which leads to the following inequality:
τˆx(a, b) =
∑n
i=1
∑n
j=1 aijbij
n¯(n¯− 1) =
∑n
i=1
∑n
j=1 aij(−aij)
n¯(n¯− 1) =
−n¯(n¯− 1)
n¯(n¯− 1) = −1.
(⇒) Let τˆx(a, b) = 1. Then,
∑n
i=1
∑n
j=1 aijbij should be n¯(n¯−1), which
means that aijbij = 1 for every vi, vj ∈ Va ∩ Vb. That is, a and b agree
on all their preferences. On the other hand, to achieve τˆx(a, b) = −1,∑n
i=1
∑n
j=1 aijbij should equal −n¯(n¯ − 1), which implies that aijbij = −1
for every vi, vj ∈ Va ∩Vb and that a|(Va⋂Vb) and b|(Va⋂Vb) are linear order-
ings. That is, a|(Va⋂Vb) and b|(Va⋂Vb) express opposing strict preferences
over all object pairs. Therefore, if τˆx(a|(Va⋂Vb), b|(Va⋂Vb)) = 1, a|(Va⋂Vb)
and b|(Va⋂Vb) are the same ranking, and if τˆx(a|(Va⋂Vb), b|(Va⋂Vb)) = −1,
b|(Va⋂Vb) is the reverse ranking of a|(Va⋂Vb) .
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7.2. Proof of theorems and corollaries
Theorem 1. (Linear transformation between τˆx and dNP−KS) Let a and
b be two arbitrary rankings over n = |V | objects drawn from the space of
non-strict incomplete rankings, Ω. Then, the τˆx correlation coefficient and
the dNP−KS distance are connected through the following equation:
dNP−KS(a, b) =
1
2
− 1
2
τˆx(a, b). (21)
Proof. For succinctness, denote a¯ = a|(Va⋂Vb) and b¯ = b|(Va⋂Vb) as the
rankings over n¯ ≤ n objects obtained by projecting a and b onto the subset
of objects V¯ = Va
⋂
Vb ranked in common. Notice that a¯ and b¯ are complete
rankings over the same reduced universe of n¯ objects (i.e., they lie in space
ΩC relative to V¯ ). As such, using 1/2 as the minimum dKS distance unit,
the corresponding τx and dKS values for a¯ and b¯ are equated as follows [23]:
τx(a¯, b¯) = 1− 4 dKS(a¯, b¯)
n¯(n¯− 1) ,
which expressed in terms of dKS yields the equivalent relationship:
dKS(a¯, b¯) =
n¯(n¯− 1)
4
− n¯(n¯− 1)τx(a¯, b¯)
4
(22)
=
n¯(n¯− 1)
4
− n¯(n¯− 1)
∑n¯
i=1
∑n¯
j=1 a¯ij b¯ij
4n¯(n¯− 1) (23)
=
n¯(n¯− 1)
4
−
∑n
i=1
∑n
j=1 aijbij
4
, (24)
where Equation (23) applies the definition of τx (see Equation (7)) with
respect to a¯ and b¯; and where Equation (24) cancels a common factor in
the second term and utilizes the fact that unranked items in either ranking
vector contribute nothing to the sum—that is the matrix inner products are
identical in the original and projected spaces. Now, multiplying both sides
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of Equation (24) by [n¯(n¯− 1)/2]−1 gives:
dKS(a¯, b¯)
n¯(n¯− 1)/2 =
1
2
−
∑n
i=1
∑n
j=1 aijbij
2n¯(n¯− 1)
⇒ dNP−KS(a, b) = 1
2
− 1
2
τˆx(a, b) 
Theorem 2. (Linear transformation between τx and dP−KS) Let a and b be
two arbitrary rankings of n = |V | objects drawn from the space of non-strict
incomplete rankings, Ω. Then, the τx correlation coefficient and the dP−KS
distance are connected through the following equation:
dP−KS(a, b) =
n¯(n¯− 1)
4
− n(n− 1)
4
τx(a, b)
where n¯ = |V¯ | = |Va
⋂
Vb| (i.e., the number of objects explicitly ranked by
both a and b).
Proof. From Theorem 1, we have that:
dNP−KS(a, b) =
1
2
− 1
2
τˆx(a, b),
which can be expanded via Equations (5) and (10) as:
dKS(a|(Va⋂Vb), b|(Va⋂Vb))
n¯(n¯− 1)/2 =
1
2
−
∑n
i=1
∑n
j=1 aijbij
2n¯(n¯− 1) .
Thus, multiplying both sides by n¯(n¯− 1)/2 yields:
dP−KS(a, b) =
n¯(n¯− 1)
4
− 1
4
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
aijbij
=
n¯(n¯− 1)
4
− n(n− 1)
4
[∑n
i=1
∑n
j=1 aijbij
n(n− 1)
]
which completes the proof since the bracketed expression matches the defi-
nition of τx(a, b).
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Corollary 1. The respective NIRA optimization problems typified by τˆx and
dNP−KS are equivalent and, thus, provide identical consensus rankings. Sim-
ilarly, the respective NIRA optimization problems typified by τx and dP−KS
are equivalent and, thus, provide identical consensus rankings.
Proof. The first part of corollary is established through the following series
of equations:
arg min
r∈ΩC
K∑
k=1
dNP−KS(r,ak) = arg max
r∈ΩC
K∑
k=1
−dNP−KS(r,ak) (25)
= arg max
r∈ΩC
K∑
k=1
−
[
1
2
− 1
2
τˆx(r,a
k)
]
(26)
= arg max
r∈ΩC
K∑
k=1
τˆx(r,a
k), (27)
where the last equation results from the fact that scalars common to every
term in the sum and constant terms do not impact the optimal solution.
Similarly, the second part of the corollary can be proved via the following
series of equations:
arg min
r∈ΩC
K∑
k=1
dP−KS(r,ak) (28)
= arg max
r∈ΩC
K∑
k=1
−dP−KS(r,ak) (29)
= arg max
r∈ΩC
K∑
k=1
−
[(|Vr ∩ Vak |)(|Vr ∩ Vak | − 1)
4
− n(n− 1)
4
τx(r,a
k)
]
(30)
= arg max
r∈ΩC
K∑
k=1
n(n− 1)
4
τx(r,a
k)− (|Vak |)(|Vak |-1)
4
(31)
= arg max
r∈ΩC
K∑
k=1
τx(r,a
k) (32)
where Equation (30) ensues from Theorem 2; where Equation (31) results
from the fact that, since r must be a complete ranking, |Vr∩Vak | = |Vak | for
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every k; and, where Equation (32) results from the fact that scalars common
to every term in the sum as well as constant terms (i.e, the second term in
Equation (31) is independent of any candidate solution) have no bearing on
the optimal solution. 
Corollary 2. The correlation-based NIRA is NP-hard.
Proof. The distance-based NIRA was proven to be NP-hard in [58]. Since
solving the correlation-based NIRA is equivalent to solving the distance-
based NIRA by Corollary 1, the former problem is also NP-hard.
Theorem 3. (Succinct function of cumulative agreement for τˆx) Let r ∈
ΩC , a
k ∈ Ω, and n¯k = |Vak | (the number of objects ranked by ak), for
k = 1, . . . ,K. Then, the τˆx cumulative correlation between r and {ak}Kk=1
can be computed according to the function:
K∑
k=1
τˆx(r,a
k) =
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
Aˆijrij ,
where [Aˆij ] =
∑K
k=1
akij
n¯k(n¯k−1) is the scaled combined ranking-matrix (SCR).
Proof. Since r ∈ ΩC , the term τˆx(r,ak) can be simplified as follows:
τˆx(r,a
k) =
∑n
i=1
∑n
j=1 a
k
ijrij
|Vak ∩ V | (|Vak ∩ V | − 1)
=
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
akijrij
n¯k(n¯k − 1) .
Thus, the denominator associated with each term is constant irrespective of
the candidate-solution vector, thereby yielding the equivalent expressions:
K∑
k=1
τx(r,a
k) =
K∑
k=1
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
akij
n¯k(n¯k − 1)rij =
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
Aˆijrij . 
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7.3. A flowchart and description of the branch and bound algorithm
Before introducing the branch and bound algorithm (B&B), it is nec-
essary to discuss the concept of an object-ordering and its connection to
a ranking. An object-ordering a−1 is induced by a mapping Ψ : a ∈
{1, . . . , n}n → a−1 ∈ W ({1, . . . , n}), where W ({1, . . . , n}) denotes the set
of weak orders (or complete preorders) on n objects. That is, Ψ(a) sorts
the objects in Va from best to worst, according to their ranks in a. For
example, for a = (1, 5, 2, 4, 3), Ψ(a) = a−1 = (v1, v3, v5, v4, v2). Extend-
ing this notation, a−1(i) specifies the ith-highest ranked object in a, when
a does not contain ties [21]—that is, Ψ is a bijection in this case and
the inverse function Ψ−1 returns a linear order. When a contains ties,
Ψ sorts the objects into preference equivalence classes. For example, for
a = (1, 3, 3, 1, 5), Ψ(a) = a−1 = (〈v1, v4〉, 〈v2, v3〉, v5). In the case of ties,
the inverse mapping Ψ−1(a−1) returns the ranking obtained by labeling each
object with its corresponding equivalence class position in a−1. For example,
for a−1 = (v1, 〈v2, v4〉, v5, v3), Ψ−1(a−1) = a = (1, 2, 5, 2, 4).
B&B is applied as follows. First, the absolute values of the SCR (CR,
respectively) matrix entries are summed to yield an upper bound on the
cumulative correlation achievable by any candidate-solution vector [23]. An
initial deviation penalty corresponding to a user-specified starting solu-
tion r0 ∈ ΩC (obtained randomly or via a heuristic) is then calculated
by subtracting its objective value from said upper bound. To describe
the ensuing steps, recall that r−10 is the object-ordering induced by the
mapping function Ψ(r0). For i = 2, . . . , n, the algorithm calculates incre-
mental penalties of fixing object r−10 (i) (ranked ith in the reference start-
ing solution) to every possible pairwise preference relative to a candidate
sub-ranking of objects r−10 (1), . . . , r
−1
0 (i − 1) by inspecting the respective
SCR entries. Three branches are created to reflect the possible ordinal
relationships—i.e., preferred, tied, and dispreferred—between r−10 (i) and
each r−10 (j) ∈ {r−10 (1), . . . , r−10 (i − 1)}. If the incremental penalty of a
branch exceeds the current minimum penalty, the branch is pruned; other-
wise it is explored by considering the next object, r−10 (i+1). B&B prioritizes
newly created branches when there are multiple branches to explore. Once
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a complete ranking is obtained, the minimum penalty is updated and the
ranking is saved as a possible solution; at the end of the algorithm, all
rankings with the final minimum penalty are returned as the set of optimal
solutions (i.e., the median or consensus rankings).
7.4. Exact integer programming formulation
Yoo and Escobedo [68] recently derived the following set of linear con-
straints that guarantee that a matrix R ∈ {−1, 0, 1}n×n is a valid ranking-
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matrix according to Equation (6):
rij − rkj − rik ≥ −1 i, j, k = 1, ..., n; i 6= j 6= k 6= i (33a)
rij + rji ≥ 0 i, j = 1, ..., n; i 6= j (33b)
rii = 0 i = 1, ..., n; (33c)
rij − 2yij = −1 i, j = 1, ..., n; i 6= j (33d)
rij ∈ Z, yij ∈ B i, j = 1, ..., n. (33e)
Constraint (33a) eliminates the occurrence of pairwise preference cycles.
Constraint (33b) restricts at least one of rij and rji to be positive since rij
and rji cannot both be negative. The diagonal elements must be set to 0,
which is represented by constraint (33c). The off-diagonal elements must be
non-zero values, specifically, they must be equal to 1 or -1. This is enforced
via auxiliary binary variable yij in constraint (33d). Constraint (33e) states
the domains of rij and yij . Using this constraint set, the correlation-based
NIRA for τˆx is obtained by appending the following objective function:
arg max
r∈ΩC
K∑
k=1
τˆx(r,a
k) = arg max
r∈ΩC
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
Aˆijrij
which uses the SCR matrix [Aˆij ] defined in Equation (15). Note that the
respective solution ranking r ∈ ΩC is obtained by sorting the row sums (or
column sums) of [rij ] in non-increasing (non-decreasing, resp.) order.
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